新葡京官方

会议时间：2025年6月23日10:00-11:30（周一）

会议地点：明德主楼734

主讲人：温泉 华盛顿大学经济系教授

主持人：马骏副教授

主题：Group Rationality and Group Stable Equilibrium

讲座简介：

In a repeated game, a strategy profile is group stable with respect to some groups of players if it is immune to deviations by any of these groups. Accordingly, a subgame perfect equilibrium is stable with respect to all single-player groups. We introduce the concept of group rationality, which is an extension of individual rationality from single-player groups to multi-player groups. For a collection of groups, a group stable equilibrium outcome must be feasible and weakly group rational for these groups. On the other hand, any feasible and strictly group rational payoff vector can be supported by a group stable equilibrium when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one, a folk theorem result for group stable equilibrium.

个人简介：

温泉，华盛顿大学Robert R.Richards经济学教授。1991年获西安大略大学经济学博士学位。研究方向为博弈论、微观经济学理论。论文发表在Econometrica,、Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory、RAND Journal of Economics、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Mathematical Economics等期刊。