新葡京官方

题目：Subsidy Design in Budget-Constrained Matching

时间：2025年12月10日10:30-12:00

地点：明德主楼734

汇报人：童昊奇（杜克大学经济学博士）

主持人：邝仲弘（新葡京官方 副教授）

个人简介：

童昊奇，杜克大学经济学博士生六年级，研究方向是微观经济理论、匹配理论以及教育经济学，2018年本科毕业于清华大学经济管理新葡京官方 。其本科论文成果Ex-ante Fairness under Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Approach曾发表于 China Economic Quarterly International。

讲座摘要：

How should a social planner optimally allocate subsidies in a budget-constrained matching market? We study this question across settings that differ in the information available to the planner. Under complete information, the planner fully observes match values and budget constraints. We provide an algorithm that computes the minimal total subsidy required to implement the welfare-maximizing matching. Under incomplete information, the planner observes the status-quo stable matching and agents’ budget constraints, but not the underlying match values. We characterize robust subsidy policies that improve aggregate welfare relative to the observed outcome. Our central result provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a subsidy to be non-distortive: for every profile of match values consistent with the observed outcome, there exists a stable matching that is weakly welfare-improving relative to the status quo. We then examine how the planner’s information set shapes the flexibility of designing targeted subsidies. In the most restrictive environment with no information about match values or budget constraints, a uniform subsidy emerges as the only non-distortive policy. Rather than eliciting preferences, our approach infers the underlying information structure from the observed outcome and identify robust policies, providing a new method for addressing informational constraints.