新葡京官方

题目：Market Size and Market Structure: Estimating an Entry Game with Agnostic Information Structure

时间：2025年11月20日10:30-12:00

地点：中关村校区明德主楼623

汇报人：卢森（中央财经大学保险新葡京官方 助理教授）

主持人：郭镠溢（新葡京官方 讲师）

个人简介：

卢森博士现任中央财经大学保险新葡京官方 助理教授。他于2024年于莱斯大学获得经济学博士学位。他的研究领域为实证产业组织、应用微观计量经济学。他的研究涉及厂商博弈和匹配博弈的结构估计。他的研究话题包括通讯频段并购、合作制药、保险需求和纯血马育种市场等。

讲座摘要：

Game-theoretic entry models usually impose strong restrictions on the predetermined information structure of the game. This paper introduces a new method for the identification and inference of payoff parameters in static entry games, while the econometrician is agnostic about the latent information structure. I examine a static entry game, assuming that all potential entrants are symmetric. I introduce a modification of Bergemann and Morris’s (2016) solution concept, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE), which I refer to as Symmetric BCE, and provide a tractable and sharp characterization of the identified set of payoff parameters. I apply the method to driving schools, investigating the impact of the number of operating firms on the profitability of potential entrants. The empirical results indicate that the new, robust method still provides informative insights. Using the notion of Symmetric BCE, as opposed to BCE, reduces the computational burden, making identification and inference feasible even with a moderate number of players.